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Abstract  
 
Research on the oversight role of the National Department of Human 
Settlements on its public entities: The case of National Home Builders 
Registration Council (NHBRC). This study looked at the National Department of 
Human Settlement’s oversight role over its entities. It took place in the context of  
broad departmental public entity oversight management. However, the 
researcher’s focus was on the systems and mechanisms used by the department 
in its oversight function with a specific focus on the National Home Builders 
Registration Council as one of its entities and determined if there were any 
impede oversight challenges.  
 
The research explored through documentary analysis and investigative 
interviews with departmental officials who are charged with the responsibility of 
overseeing the governance of all entities reporting to the NDoH. Key 
accountability documentation, and commentary documents from oversight 
organs of state such the Auditor General and  Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Human Settlements were also reviewed and analysed.  
 
 5 
The research discovered that the department’s oversight over the NHBRC, is 
mainly focusing on compliance enforcement. The mechanisms and systems used 
are somewhat biased towards compliance monitoring. As a result of the skewed 
focus, there is an imbalance between legislative enforcement and service 
delivery on the part of NHBRC. Although the research could not make inferences 
to other public entities, the study helped in developing an understanding of 
challenges associated with oversight (generally) and the strength and 
weaknesses of the department’s oversight systems and mechanisms (in 
particular). The research  unveiled a need for an improvement in regard to the 
oversight systems and approach, and concludes by recommending that it would 
be necessary that government should introduce a holistic oversight framework 
that would guide and promote efficiency and effectiveness in all “public entities 
oversight initiatives”. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS  
 
Accounting Authority is the Board of Directors of a Public Entity   
Accounting Officer is the Chief Executive Officer of a public entity  
Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled and the major attributes of corporate governance are transparency 
and accountability  
Executive Authority this word is used interchangeably with Minister of the Parent 
Department - In terms of the PFMA 
Governing body The governing body of a public entity is the equivalent of the 
private sector concept of a board of governing body members.  The governing 
body is the focal point for good corporate governance within a public entity and is 
accountable and responsible for the performance, service delivery and affairs of 
the public entity.  These terms are used interchangeably in this document. 
Parent department  is a department  that establishes and owns the entity  
PFMA is the Public Finance Management Act (No1 of 1999 as Amended)  
Public entity  structures established outside government departments  
Public entities policy it is a policy developed and approved by the Department of 
Human Settlements for use over its entities  
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Public governance is the system by which government departments and its 
Public Entities are directed and controlled 
Servcon Housing Solution is a private company established as a product of the 
Record of Understanding between government and financial institutions or 
lenders where lenders pledged to re-enter the low income housing market. 
Servcon is a private company established in terms of the Company’s Act of 1973 
and was mandated to provide exclusive management services with respect to the 
designated or ring-fenced portfolio comprising 33 306 Properties in Possession 
(PIP’s) and Non-Performing Loans (NPL’s) with a value of R1, 277 billion, for a 
period of 8 years from 1 April 1998 to 31 March 2006.  
Thubelisha Homes is a section 21 company, established as a “special purpose 
vehicle to facilitate the acquisition of rightsizing housing stock and the disposal of 
these houses to Servcon clients”.  
 National Department of Human Settlements is herein referred to as ‘Department’ 
National Home Builders Registration Council is a public entity established in 
terms of the Housing Consumer Protection Measures Act of 1998, and has been 
providing an exclusive regulatory function in the home building environment. It 
was established in November 1998 with the mandate to protect potential housing 
consumers from unscrupulous homebuilders. It has since been striving to 
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regulate and provide better services to the consumers through registration of 
homebuilders and enrolment of homes.   
National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) is a corporation established as a 
result of a Cabinet decision in May 1996, as envisaged in the White Paper on 
Housing, which was approved by Cabinet on 7 December 1994. NHFC was 
established to search for new and better ways to mobilise finance for housing, 
from sources outside the state, in partnership with the broadest range of 
organisations.   
Nurcha is a Section 21 Company established as a Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) Presidential Lead Project in 1995 by agreement 
between the South African Government and the Open Society Institute of New 
York. The primary function of Nurcha is to help release finance for low cost 
housing from financial institutions. Nurcha’s main activity is to offer guarantees to 
banks to encourage them to make bridging finance loans available to developers 
in cases where banks are not prepared to approve such loans without additional 
security, and thus facilitate the flow of finance from financial institutions into low-
income housing development.   
Rural Housing Loan Fund is a section 21 company established to provide 
incremental loans to rural communities for housing purposes.    
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Social Housing Foundation is a section 21 company established to broadly 
develop and build capacity for social housing; to encourage networking both 
locally and internationally by bringing various players together in a range of 
different forums, to promote information and skills exchanges and cooperation 
and to develop a policy framework for social housing.  
Peoples Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT) is a capacity building entity 
established in 1997, to implement a capacity building programme to support the 
Peoples Housing Process. The main objective of the programme is to develop 
capacity at all levels of government, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
Community Based Organisations (CBO’s) and communities to support the 
Peoples Housing Process.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
 
Since 1994, the South African government has created a large number of 
institutions outside of normal departmental structures.  These institutions have 
been set up in order to achieve a wide variety of objectives, including providing 
advice, facilitating investments, delivering services, and providing strategic 
goods.  These institutions have been created in terms of a range of different 
methods, principally: separate enabling Acts that uniquely regulate the public 
purpose mandate of each institution; general company or trust statutes, either 
through registration in terms of the Companies Act, or as trusts or funds; or a 
combination of the above.  These approaches were used in the absence of an 
overarching policy and procedural framework, resulting in these institutions being 
subject to an array of regulatory, governance and accountability arrangements.   
One example in this regard would be entities established to support the Ministry 
of Human Settlements in its quest to provide ‘adequate shelter’ to the needy 
South African societies. Section 26 of the Constitution enshrines the importance 
of providing adequate shelter to every citizen of the country.  Accordingly, the 
provision of shelter falls within the ambit of the state.  It is for this reason that the 
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state, in its attempt to realize this constitutional requirement has, over an above 
the Ministry of Housing (now Human Settlements), created a number of public 
entities to support the ministry to adequately deliver on its mandate in terms of 
the Housing Act, 1997 (Act No. 107 of 1997) which empowers the Minister of 
Human Settlements to establish and finance national institutions for the purpose 
of housing development and supervise the execution of their mandate.  
As such, eight housing support institutions were established as public entities 
accountable to the Minister.  As generally acknowledged, the expectation is that 
these entities would deliver on mandated policy imperatives in the manner that is 
efficient and cost-effective in line with commercial principles whilst ensuring strict 
compliance to the manner in which public finances are managed.   
At the time when these entities were established, the broader aim was to  ensure 
that the housing Ministry gets the necessary support in its quest to stabilise the 
housing environment with a view to create an enabling environment for the 
creation of sustainable human settlements. Central to this objective was to 
ensure that there is maximum benefit of State expenditure in respect of housing.  
Generally, the rationale for establishing entities outside parent departments is 
that certain services could be more efficiently and cost-effectively undertaken in 
specialised environments by professionally-managed, arms-length agencies 
functioning on commercial principles.  
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Government, as the Executive Authority (EA), and as the owner/shareholder in 
public entities, is concerned with policy implementation of service delivery and 
acts as a regulator.  It determines the overall policy and desired direction as it 
relates to the provision of a service. The relationship is one of controlled and 
managed involvement in its investment without negatively impacting on the 
independence of the accounting authorities (the Boards of Directors) and without 
getting involved in the day to day management of its entities.  
 
Zăpodean et al (2008), argues that it is important that the principles of good 
governance in public entities be applied to determine the efficiency of decision-
making bodies in achieving the objectives in terms of their fiduciary duties. 
However, the arms length relationship between those entrusted with oversight 
responsibility and the   governing boards who are the accounting authorities of 
these entities has a potential risk of creating a control gap for government and 
stifling service delivery and the associated social benefits. 
 
As such, it is expected that the Executive Authority should play an active role in 
discharging its responsibilities with regard to the following1:  
                                                          
1 Huggo Du Toit, Director Corporate Governance, ‘Governance oversight role over state owned 
entities (soe’s)’ – ( National Treasury, 2005) 
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i) Insisting on a high standard of governance in order to strengthen the 
accountability of the Board, necessitating specific reports on a 
quarterly basis as per relevant statutes to enable the Executive 
Authority to monitor progress and performance.  
ii) Ensuring t hat entities set targets, both financial and non-financial, and 
agree on a (target) optimal capital structure annually before 
commencement of the budget process. As shareholder, government 
should agree on dividend policies that are driven by the agreed capital 
structure, profitability and level of agreed future capital expenditure. 
iii) As much as reasonably possible, clearly detail the role and 
responsibilities of the board as a whole and of individual directors, 
taking into account potential conflict of interest between the 
shareholder’s regulatory responsibilities as government and 
shareholder’s responsibilities on the other hand. The mandate will 
include any requirements to meet explicit stated Government socio-
economic objectives. 
iv) As such, the board should ensure that it has clear understanding of the 
mandate and the implications of its implementation and will seek clarity 
where in doubt. 
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This research looks at the Department of Human Settlements’ oversight on the 
National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC).  
 
1.1.1 Establishment and Mandate of NHBRC 
 
The National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) is an organ of state 
established in terms of the Home Consumers Protection Measures Act 1998 (Act No. 
95 of 1998) to protect all housing consumers against defined structural defects and to 
regulate the built industry.  Primarily, its mandate is to manage the risk of structural 
defects in the home building industry and, in so doing, protect the housing consumer.  
Chapter 1 of the Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act, Act No. 95 of 1998 
as amended prescribes the mandate of the National Home Builders Registration 
Council (NHBRC). The Act states the objects of the Council as follows:  
(a) to represent the interests of housing consumers by providing warranty 
protection against defects in new homes; 
(b) to regulate the home building industry 
(c) to provide protection to housing consumers in respect of the failure of 
home builders to comply with their obligations in terms of this Act; 
(d) to establish and to promote ethical and technical standards in the home 
building industry;  
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(e) to improve structural quality in the interests of housing consumers and the 
home building industry; (f)  to promote housing consumer rights and to 
provide housing consumer information;  
(f) to communicate with and to assist home builders to register in terms of 
this Act; 
(g) to assist home builders, through training and inspection, to achieve and to 
maintain satisfactory technical standards of home building; 
(h) to regulate insurers contemplated in section 23(9)(a); and 
(i) in particular, to achieve the stated objects of this section in the subsidy 
housing sector. 
 
It is in this context that the NHBRC sees its stakeholders as all those that are 
involved in the value chain of housing delivery, especially the housing consumer in 
both the subsidy and the non-subsidy sectors. Over and above, the risk management 
tools used by the NHBRC in the government subsidy sector include, geotechnical 
assessments, structural assessments, construction management assessment, full 
time on-site inspections, the registration of Home Builders and Developers, the 
development and upkeep of the Home Building Manual that incorporates design and 
construction rules, and the appointment of competent persons by the Home Builder 
and Developer to perform geotechnical investigations and rational designs.  However 
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a lot coming from the public and the media in general suggest that there are no 
sufficient checks and balances to ensure that these risk management tools are 
effectively managed.  
 
1.1.2 Institutional Relationship with National Department of Human Settlements   
 
Government as a Social Responsibility Regulator, through NHBRC as an entity of 
government, regulates the home building industry to protect all housing consumers 
from unscrupulous home builders.  
 
The NHBRC is governed by a Council appointed by the Minister of Human 
Settlements who is the Executive Authority and is subject to compliance with the 
Public Finance Management Act, (Act No. 1 of 1999) (PFMA). PFMA defines the 
manner in which the Council must govern itself as well at how the Council should 
manage and report on the utilization of its funds.   Annually, the NHBRC submit to 
shareholder (Minister of Human Settlements) delivery plans or strategic plans.  
Periodically, this entity submits progress reports on its performance in relation to 
service delivery targets, financial performance as well as corporate governance.  
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1.1.3  The oversight role of the National Department of Human Settlements  
 
The National Department of Human Settlements is the sole shareholder of NHBRC. 
The Minister of Human Settlements is the Executive Authority, accountable to 
Parliament on all matters relating to the functioning of the NHBRC. For effective 
oversight management, the department has to strive to adhere and enforce all 
applicable regulatory frameworks and monitor service delivery by its public entities.  
 
Therefore, as with other Departments, the National Department of Human 
Settlements should ensure compliance to regulatory frameworks such as the Public 
Finance Management Act, 1999 (as Amended), Treasury Regulations, Entity specific 
legislation (Own Enabling legislation), King Code and the Protocol on Corporate 
Governance. This responsibility should be expressed in the Shareholder Compact 
signed between the Executive Authority and the Chairpersons of the Boards of 
entities.   
 
The Department acknowledges by in large, that  the PFMA is critical in the execution 
of the oversight function over its entities. Its oversight is therefore informed by the 
legislative prescripts as enshrined in the Act. Accordingly, the NHBRC submits 
annual strategic corporate plans for approval by the Executive Authority. In 
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implementing the strategic corporate plans, NHBRC submits quarterly service 
delivery progress reports to departments.  The only mechanism used by the 
department to ensure that NHBRC performs well on its mandate is by way of tracking 
service deliver performance against approved Strategic Corporate Plans, which sets 
out pre-determined performance measures and indicators. 
 
As indicated above, the Department established the NHBRC in terms of ‘its own 
enabling legislation’ to ensure that it delivers on a legislated mandate. It is envisaged 
and expected that the legislative framework establishing the NHBRC should enable  
the department to effectively oversee NHBRC governance and its operations.  
 
It may concluded that the step taken by government to establish the National Home 
Builders Registration Council  was genuine and for a defined purpose. The home 
building industry is one of the largest economic sectors in the economy of South 
Africa. If left un-regulated, it would have dire consequences for the social wellbeing of 
the society. Therefore, as a social responsibility regulator, government would be 
exposed to massive social welfare obligation in the area of shelter provision.  
 
 22 
Government’s biggest responsibility is to ensure that NHBRC performs in terms of its 
statutes and delivers what was initially intended when its enabling legislation was 
promulgated. Notwithstanding the above, service delivery is highly depended on 
adherence to good corporate governance.  
 
Available documentation suggests that the Department of Human Settlements has 
been experiencing oversight challenges when dealing with its entities, in general, 
particularly in respect of service delivery and adherence to good corporate 
governance.  Quite often, this has a negative impact on service delivery and the 
ultimate beneficiary of such services becomes the looser.  The Department has seen 
a growing number of complaints against the National Home Builders Registration 
Council from the public as well as Parliament in respect of its service. This prompted 
a need to determine if there are challenges in respect of the Department of Human 
Settlements in its role as overseer of National Home Builders Registration Council’s 
with particular reference to the mechanisms and systems used to monitor service 
delivery and enforce accountability.   
 
In broad terms, the research paper determined challenges impacting on the 
Department of Human Settlements’ oversight role over NHBRC in the area of 
policy implementation and accountability. Furthermore this research explored the 
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possibility of developing effective mechanisms to enhance the Department’s 
oversight.  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Public entities are established, amongst others, to collectively contribute to the 
achievement of boarder government objectives and priorities. It has been broadly 
acknowledged that state owned entities have been instrumental in achieving 
government’s goals and objectives through the implementation of policy. 
 
However, Government as a shareholder should employ oversight systems and 
mechanisms to ensure effective policy implementation by each of its entities. The 
efficiency and integrity of each government department’s oversight role is of 
great significance to service delivery in general. Therefore, this role needs to be 
properly carried out if government is to derive positive returns from its 
investment.  
 
In general, the mechanisms and systems employed by the Department of Human 
Settlements in respect of its role to overseer its entities warrant a closer investigation.  
Available documentation suggests that the Department of Human Settlements has 
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been experiencing oversight challenges when dealing with the National Home 
Builders Registration Council, particularly in respect of service delivery and 
adherence to good corporate governance.  Quite often, this has a negative impact on 
service delivery and the ultimate beneficiary of such services becomes the looser.  
The Department has seen a growing number of complaints against the National 
Home Builders Registration Council from the public as well as Parliament in respect 
of its service delivery and its governance. These include, 
 
i) Inadequacies in service delivery by NHBRC 
There is currently no framework in South Africa to ensure that those who conduct 
inspections are sufficiently skilled and knowledgeable in the built environment 
and can be trusted by all the stakeholders to protect their interest, while most 
importantly ensuring that the quality standards are complied with. Various 
stakeholders with varied developmental requirements are involved in the quality 
assurance exercised during housing delivery. There is no coordination of role 
players in the housing sector when it comes to this element.  
 
ii)  Corporate governance and accountability  
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NHBRC has since 2007 been experiencing internal operational difficulties that 
have impacted on corporate governance. Symptomatic to these problems has 
been its inability to comply with the statutes. For an example, submission of 
Annual Reports to Parliament on time in the past years has been a challenge for 
the NHBRC. This is a contravention of the Public Finance Management Act, 
1999 (Act No.1 of 1999) and non compliance with this Act is a criminal offence. 
At some point, the Board had to suspend its Chief Executive Officer, partly due to 
this element.  
 
iii) Customer care  
The operational tools used by the NHBRC to ensure maximum protection of 
housing consumers from unscrupulous home builders include, geotechnical 
assessments, structural assessments, construction management assessment, 
full time on-site inspections, the registration of Home Builders and Developers, 
the development and upkeep of the Home Building Manual that incorporates 
design and construction rules, and the appointment of competent persons by the 
Home Builder and Developer to perform geotechnical investigations and rational 
designs.   
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However a lot coming from the public and the media in general suggest that 
there are no sufficient checks and balances to ensure that these tools are 
effectively managed. Oversight by the Department does not extend to the day to 
day operations of the NHBRC at project implementation level. With the 
increasing number of complaints from the public, this deficiency is putting a lot of 
strain on the Department of human settlements’ oversight role. 
 
The above issues might be a reflection of possible structural weaknesses and or 
governance oversight loop holes within the NDoHS’ oversight. Indication is that, 
these challenges have persisted for quite a considerable number of years since the 
establishment of this entity and have sparked an outcry in the circles of 
government particularly National Treasury, Auditor General and Parliament, 
questioning the ability of the National Department of Human Settlements’ 
capacity and ability in respect of its oversight.    
 
It was therefore opportune to explore any of such oversight challenges as they posed 
a serious threat to effective service delivery as well as good governance within the 
entity.  As such, the ultimate goal of this research is to determine the structural 
weaknesses with regard to the oversight role of the Department. 
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1.3 Research objectives 
 
This research looks at the National Department of Human Settlement’s oversight role 
over the National Home Builders Registration Council. Broadly, the research will 
determine the challenges affecting the oversight role of the National Department of 
Human Settlements and determine if there are any oversight structural weaknesses 
and gaps that may be impacting on the ability of this entity to fully implement its 
mandate.  
 
Therefore, the broader aim of the study is to determine challenges impacting on the 
oversight function of the Department on NHBRC. Based on the findings, the study 
seeks to make recommendations to enhance the oversight function of the 
Department.  
  
1.4  Research Questions 
  
1.4.1 Primary research question 
 
According to Zikmund (2003) a research question is the researcher’s translation of 
the business problem into a specific need for inquiry.  The primary research question 
for this study is “what are the factors impeding the oversight role of the Department of 
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Human Settlements’ over the NHBRC?’ or what are the oversight challenges of the 
Department of Human Settlements’ 
 
1.4.1 Secondary research questions 
 
The following secondary questions are designed with a view to assist in gathering 
relevant information used to answer the primary research question above.  
 What are the oversight control measures used by NDHS for ensuring good 
governance and effective policy implementation by NHBRC? 
 What mechanisms can be put in place to enhance oversight? 
  
1.5 Structure of the report  
 
This report is structured in terms of the following chapters. 
Chapter one:- Introduces the orientation of the study and provides a brief background 
of the project and a snapshot of the National Home Builders Registration Council, its 
institutional relationship with the NDHS and the current oversight systems and 
mechanisms of the Department.  Importantly, it also states the objectives, problem 
statement and research questions, as well as the motivation and significance of the 
study. 
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Chapter two:- Covers the review of literature on the subject matter and incorporates 
literature from a range of published books, scientific journals and research 
dissertations and theses.  This chapter also discusses literature on corporate 
governance and government oversight in general.  
Chapter three:- Discusses in detail the research methodology applied, research 
design, the measuring instrument and the fieldwork procedure followed. 
Chapter four:- Consist of the research findings including the analysis of the data. 
Chapter five consists of a summary, conclusion and recommendations for further 
research. 
 
1.6  Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it is important to indicate that the research has explored and 
determined the factors impeding the Department of Human Settlements’ oversight 
over its entities particularly the National Home Builders Registration Council. The 
following chapter provides a comprehensive review of literature on this subject with a 
view of detailing different perspectives of other scholars and researchers of oversight. 
Furthermore, the section also attempts to highlight available literature on this topic 
and the key themes for purposes of this research.    
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
As Bruce (1994) argues, the purpose of literature is to provide the background to and 
justification for the research undertaken.  Literature exposing the manner in which 
NDHS exercises oversight particularly in ensuring that entities perform in accordance 
with their establishment mandate was explored. Whilst this was the primary objective 
of the review, this section also attempts to provide a ‘context definition’ of oversight; 
the necessary systems, tools, mechanisms, structures and institutional arrangements 
for effective oversight.  
 
2.2 Defining Oversight 
 
In the context of this study, oversight refers to the legislative and/ or parental role of 
the departments (Executive Authorities) over its public entities. These include the 
monitoring of day to day activities of the Board as well as company executives.  
 
The primary objective of oversight is to create an enabling environment and the 
culture of good corporate governance and effective accountability.  Gloeck (2003:3) 
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argues further and insinuates that the central question has not been whether or not 
government and the public service providers should be accountable, but rather how 
they can be more accountable. However, it is contestable, if institutionally, and at 
official level there is willingness to institutionalize oversight as a key management 
function at departmental level.  
 
According to the Open Society Foundation (2006), the purpose of oversight is, of 
course, to hold the executive accountable, and to seek to remedy situations where 
the executive has not performed according to its legislated mandate. The intention of 
oversight is, primarily, constructive engagement in order to improve the performance 
of those structures being overseen and to reflect the concerns of the people to those 
same bodies. The key term here is constructive oversight. Constructive oversight 
ensures a ‘clean, efficient and open administration (good government); it ensures 
effective policy and legislation (development); and it does this in a manner that is not 
necessarily adversarial (co-operative governance) although it may be adversarial in 
the interests of good government at times. 
 
On the other hand the South African Parliament defined oversight as a 
constitutionally mandated function of legislative organs of state to scrutinise and 
oversee executive action and any organ of state (Parliament: 2003). 
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2.3 Oversight management: A case for South Africa  
 
It is critical to indicate the basis of oversight from the onset. In terms of the South 
African Constitution 1996, government is divided into three branches, namely the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Each branch has its own structures and 
bodies to enable it fulfil its particular roles and responsibilities. Thus the legislature 
has Parliament, the judiciary has Courts and the executive has Cabinet and 
ministries – with departments and various business and non-business entities 
(referred to as ‘non-departmental entities’ or public entities). 
 
Public entities are a subset of institutions belonging to the executive branch of 
government. They are distinct from departments in that they are usually separate 
juristic persons from the State. They also usually enjoy a greater degree of 
autonomy/independence than departments. The non-departmental entities fall under 
the authority of a Minister who is accountable to Parliament for their functioning. Each 
Minister is usually only responsible for one department, but, in addition, they may be 
responsible for a number of these other entities. 
 
Kekana (2002) says the creation of such entities is to create an independent body 
which to a large extent can operate outside the stricter control and more 
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independently from the state department under which an entity/enterprise is 
classified to render certain services whether as a business enterprise or entity or as a 
non-business. Furthermore, these entities should carry out their business without 
interference from government or manage their businesses more in line with private 
business principles and even on a competitive basis. Some government business 
enterprises are not always viable projects for private business enterprise, more 
especially from the view point of profit-making, yet necessary for the country and the 
government to achieve its goals of service delivery. As such, the State will embark on 
such an enterprise in the interest of its citizens  
 
The Departments of Public Service and Administration and National Treasury took a 
stance that the existing policy frameworks for classifying and managing public sector 
institutions in South Africa need to be improved. Accordingly, there is an 
acknowledgement that the current frameworks do adequately address   
government’s need to ensure good corporate governance and accountability2.  
 
It follows therefore that one of the areas requiring the attention of government is that 
all public resources, and therefore all public entities and government enterprises, 
                                                          
2
 Departments of Public Service Administration and National Treasury (2002) ‘Draft Framework 
on the Governance and Administration of Public Entities.’  
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should be subjected to an appropriate degree of democratic control and oversight so 
as to ensure proper stewardship and application of these resources. Generally, 
government acknowledges the practical challenges associated with its oversight role 
over its entities3. 
 
Various constitutional institutions (examples include parliamentary portfolio 
committees, select committees, SCOPA etc) have been introduced and established 
to exercise oversight with a view to ensure maximum return on investment in definite 
areas.  As such, oversight is spread throughout government machinery and across 
levels and spheres. 
 
Section 55(2) of the South African Constitution outlines the oversight powers of the 
National Assembly, by requiring that it “must provide for mechanisms to ensure that 
all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to 
it; and to maintain oversight of the exercise by the national executive authority, 
including the implementation of legislation; and any organ of state.” Parliament and 
the nine provincial legislatures have permanent committees in the form of Portfolio 
Committees. Each portfolio committee is linked to a different portfolio of the executive 
                                                          
3
 Departments of Public Service Administration and National Treasury (2002) ‘Draft Framework 
on the Governance and Administration of Public Entities.’ 
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normally Ministries. The members of the committee are drawn from members of 
parliament (MPs) at national level, or members of the provincial legislatures (MPLs) 
at provincial level. At both national and provincial level, portfolio committees exert 
oversight over government policy, actions, legislation and budgets (Open Society 
Foundation: 2006). 
 
To fulfill its oversight and accountability mandate, Parliament has established 
mechanisms through which Committees can interact with civil society organizations, 
organised business, experts and professional bodies as a way of enhancing 
accountability. These Committees can call Ministers, departmental heads and 
governing boards of entities to account on any issue relating to any matter over 
which they are effecting accountability within the ambit of the provisions of sections 
56 and 69 of the Constitution and legislation.  
 
Stemming from the above, it is critical to note that the concept of oversight contains 
many aspects which include political, administrative, financial, ethical, legal and 
strategic elements. Therefore current practices and oversight mechanisms would 
include the committees of Parliament (with their associated practices), specialist 
divisional units within government departments as well as Auditor General. In 
conducting oversight, the committee would either request a briefing from the organ of 
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state or visit the organ of state for fact-finding, depending on the purpose of the 
oversight. The committees would have to consider the appropriate means for 
conducting oversight to cover all organs of state. (Parliament: 2003) 
 
The Executive Authority (Responsible Minister) is the governing body that is 
responsible for the effective and efficient delivery of the service delivery requirements 
identified and also exercises shareholder oversight.  The schematic diagram below 
indicates the current oversight management of state owned entities in general. The 
arrows in thick black indicate the oversight path and the reporting practice.  
Figure 1 Oversight of State Owned Entities  
 
Source: National Treasury, 2004 
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The above oversight arrangement depicts deferent players in the overall oversight 
value chain. Whist the focus of this study is on oversight at the ‘Executive Authority or 
departmental level’ there seems to be common challenges at both the National 
Assembly (at committee level) and the Executive Authority (at departmental level0. 
Oversight mechanisms and tools used by the departments over entities to account 
for their performance, using their strategic plans, budget documents and annual 
reports remains a huge challenge.  
 
Some commentators are highly critical of ministerial responsibility as the chief 
mechanism for achieving accountability, and describe the concept as possessing 
only ‘fading utility’4. At this point one can advert to the role of the Public Protector and 
certain of the other Chapter 9 institutions - they are alternative mechanisms, besides 
ministerial responsibility, of holding the executive accountability.   
 
2.4 Fundamentals of effective oversight  
 
It is necessary for the National government to oversee the operations of public 
institutions to uphold the principle of public control. However, for oversight and public 
control to be effective, oversight must be reinforced by sufficient access to 
                                                          
4 N Lewis & D Longley, ‘Ministerial Responsibility: The Next Steps’ 1996 Public Law 490 at 493) in 
Cordier et al (1999) 
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information so that governments can regulate these institutions and so that citizens 
can control governments (Sanford et al: 1975).  
 
2.4.1 Functions of oversight 
 
For purposes of strengthening oversight, Parliament developed and introduced 
mechanisms to guide its work on oversight. The mechanisms introduced require 
‘oversight’ to be strong both administratively and politically. Accordingly, the following 
key functional elements need to be adhered to enable strong administrative and 
political oversight (Parliament: 2003). 
      
(i) To detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour or illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and public 
agencies. At the core of this function is the protection of the rights and 
liberties of citizens. 
(ii) To hold the government to account in respect of how the taxpayers’ 
money is used. It detects waste within the machinery of government and 
public agencies. Thus it can improve the efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness of government operations. 
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(iii) To ensure that policies announced by government and authorised by 
Parliament are actually delivered. This function includes monitoring the 
achievement of goals set by legislation and the government's own 
programmes. 
(iv) To improve the transparency of government operations and enhance 
public trust in the government, which is itself a condition of effective policy 
delivery. 
 
However, corporate governance of state-owned enterprises has proved to be a major 
challenge in many economies. Notwithstanding the above, there is currently no 
international benchmark to help governments assess and improve the way they 
exercise ownership of these enterprises, which often constitute a significant share of 
the economy. To correct the aforementioned, there is a need to find a balance 
between the state's responsibility for actively exercising its ownership functions 
(administrative), such as the nomination and election of the board, while at the same 
time refraining from imposing undue (political interference) in the management of the 
company (Johnston: 2005).  
 
In South Africa, the state should act as an informed and active owner and establish a 
clear and consistent ownership policy, ensuring that the governance of state-owned 
 40 
enterprises is carried out in a transparent and accountable manner, with the 
necessary degree of professionalism and effectiveness (Johnston: 2005).  
 
2.4.2 Elements of effective oversight  
 
For oversight to be effective, whether at administrative or political level, it is critical 
that government (as owner) should clearly describe its role particularly its governance 
relationship with its entities  
 
This is supported by Johnston (2005), when he insists that government should 
develop and issue an ownership policy that defines the overall objectives of state 
ownership, the state’s role in the corporate governance of SOEs, and how it will 
implement its ownership policy. However he emphasizes that government should 
avoid involvement in the day-to-day management of SOEs and allow them full 
operational autonomy to achieve their defined objectives. In essence the boards 
should exercise their responsibilities and their independence should be respect. 
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At the same time, this approach should not demean government’s role to exercise its 
ownership rights. According to the legal structure of each company, government 
should exercise its prime responsibilities to (Johnson: 2005), 
 
(ii) Be represented at the general shareholders meetings and 
voting the state shares. 
(iii) Establish well structured and transparent board nomination 
processes in fully or majority owned SOEs, and actively 
participating in the nomination of all SOEs’ boards. 
(iv) Set-up reporting systems allowing regular monitoring and 
assessment of SOE performance. 
(v) Maintain continuous dialogue with external auditors and specific 
state control organs were permitted by the legal system and the 
state’s level of ownership, 
(vi) Ensure that remuneration schemes for SOE board members 
foster the long term interest of the company and can attract and 
motivate qualified professionals. 
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The above elements need to be supported by concise regulatory frameworks in order 
to promote effective oversight. For this purpose, in South Africa, the following 
frameworks have been put in place to ensure effective oversight:  
 
i) Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (as Amended) 
ii) Treasury Regulations 
iii) Entity specific legislation (Own Enabling legislation)  
iv) Signing of Shareholder Compact or Performance agreement  
 
The PFMA was introduced in 1999 to regulate financial management in the public 
sector. All public sector departments and agencies are bound by the legislative 
prescripts as enshrined in the Act. The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), 
1999 gives effect to financial management reforms that place greater implementation 
responsibility on managers in the public service, and makes them more accountable 
for their performance. In terms of these two legislative frameworks, entities are 
supposed to submit annual strategic corporate plans for approval by the Executive 
Authority. In implementing the strategic corporate plans, entities submit quarterly 
service delivery progress reports to departments. Departments use these reports as 
a tool to exercise their oversight. Coupled with this legislation, government introduced 
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Treasury Regulations to supplement the provisions of the PFMA. The PFMA is 
critical in the execution of the oversight function over public sector agencies or 
entities 5 .  
 
For proper oversight management, entities have to be established in terms of ‘own’ 
legislation. Where an entity is established in terms of legislation, the legislation 
stipulates governance provisions as well as its relationship with the Executive 
Authority including the signing of shareholder compact6. Shareholder Compacts or 
Performance Agreements are introduced to: – 
i) Formalise and regulate the working relationship between the Minister and the 
Board pursuant to the provisions of the Act applicable to the specific public 
entity and the PFMA. 
ii) Set out the mandated key performance measures and indicators to be 
attained by the public entity. 
iii) Facilitate the assessment and monitoring of the Board’s performance against 
the public entity performance in delivering the desired outcomes and 
objectives. 
                                                          
5
 Huggo Du Toit, Director Corporate Governance, ‘Governance oversight role over state owned 
entities (soe’s)’ – ( National Treasury, 2005) 
6
 Departments of Public Service Administration and National Treasury (2002) ‘Draft Framework 
on the Governance and Administration of Public Entities.’ 
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iv) Define procedures and reporting channels for accountability arrangements 
and quarterly reporting to the Minister or the Minister’s representative in order 
to facilitate effective performance monitoring, evaluation, as set out in the 
Shareholder Compact or Performance Agreement and corrective action to be 
taken. 
 
2.4.3 Factors affecting oversight  
 
Whilst the above legislative frameworks have been introduced and are being used as 
oversight tools by parent departments and guide the relationship between the 
Executive Authority and its entity Mesquita et al (2007), argues that Agencies have 
no incentive to conceal their activities from the overseer.   
 
He insists on the need for reforms that are likely to reduce inefficiency such as those 
that improve overseer expertise. The parliamentary study on oversight and 
accountability reveals that, that at political level,  the challenge facing portfolio 
committees is that they need to ensure that departments (including their public 
entities) provide good quality service delivery information in their strategic plans with 
tight performance targets and then to ensure that departments report against those 
targets in their annual reports. Furthermore, it may be concluded that the end-year or 
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ex post oversight mechanisms in legislatures have been relatively weak, as 
legislatures (both at national and provincial spheres of government) have focused on 
narrow financial oversight only, through the public accounts committee process. 
 
Similarly, at the administrative level, the ‘managed relationship’ between the public 
entities and parent departments, has not been without challenges across national 
departments.  A study by National Treasury highlighted the following impediments on 
government’s effective oversight on its entities7 .  
 
 Capacity and organisation of the ‘parent’ department:  Good practice in 
this area is for parent departments to establish units with appropriate 
capacity to oversee the entities for which the Minister is responsible, and 
that all reporting lines should go through this unit, for both performance 
and finance. These units should also be responsible for giving feedback to 
entities (both from the Minister and based on their own analysis) (DPSA & 
NT: 2005).  
 
                                                          
7
 Departments of Public Service Administration and National Treasury (2002) ‘Draft Framework 
on the Governance and Administration of Public Entities.’ 
 46 
The challenge with a parent department that is incapacitated or improperly 
organized is that any official may demand information at any given time 
from the entity particularly on cross cutting issues.  This creates resistance 
from the part of entities because at times this is done by junior officials 
from various business units. Quiet often requesting same information over 
again. Established oversight units   should be supported by the top 
management of the parent department particularly when dealing with 
strategic matters affecting entities. The absence of executive support 
degrades the department’s efforts to enforce mandate or policy 
implementation.  
 
 Deficient Financial and Performance Accountability: The performance of 
an entity, whether satisfactory or not is a mirror image of the department’s 
oversight efficiencies. Therefore relationship between parent department 
and entity is defined in terms of financial and performance accountability. 
In order for performance accountability to be measured, the objectives of 
entities have to be translated into annual performance targets. The review 
indicates that ‘good practice’ in this regard involves two things: annual 
service delivery contracts with the chief executive officer of the entity and 
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compilation of these contracts by a central body for tabling in Parliament 
(DPSA & NT: 2005).  
 
Furthermore, the statutory requirement is that strategic plans of entities 
should be approved on an annual basis and implementation monitored on 
a quarterly basis to promote financial accountability. Although 
departments do receive quarterly reports and satisfy themselves on 
compliance matters, quiet often salient issues raised by entities do not get 
attended to on time by top management. This defies the importance of 
accountability in respect of service delivery performance and financial 
accountability. 
 
 Political meddling: although it is the prerogative of politicians to change 
policies, when this happens too frequently, or when the changes are 
perceived to be arbitrary or unnecessary, it generates resistance. 
Therefore political continuity regarding the roles and functioning of entities 
is crucial to ensuring their efficiency and effectiveness (DPSA & NT: 
2005).  
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The lifespan of entities is determined by the social needs of the country’s 
population. When government changes occur at political level, whether 
changes in ministries or at political party level, many a times new 
ministries bring along changes in terms of policy and therefore approach 
to service delivery. This creates confusion and resistance on the part of 
entities.  
  
Notwithstanding the above, there is an acknowledgement that these impediments 
can only be endemic if government does not prioritise its oversight role.  
 
2.5 Mechanisms to enhance oversight   
 
The government as the owner/shareholder is concerned with policy 
implementation of service delivery and acts as regulator.  The focus on 
governance intervention is a key factor if government is to realise the benefit of 
its investment in its public entities. Central to this is the legitimacy and the 
effectiveness of the management of entities i.e. from governing boards to the 
company executives. 
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It is important that note that oversight by the government rests by and large on 
the prescripts of the Public Finance management Act, Act No. 1 of 1999 (PFMA). 
The PFMA governs or gives authority to the Executive Authority (Minister of the 
Parent department) oversight powers with particular reference to the corporate 
plans, shareholder’s compacts and quarterly reporting on progress in respect of 
service delivery. 
 
In relation to the capacity and organisation of the ‘parent’ department, and as 
indicated earlier in this document, very often the parent departments are more 
responsible for the malfunctioning of control mechanisms than the entities. It is 
therefore critical for parent departments to establish oversight units with appropriate 
capacity to oversee the entities for which the Minister is responsible, and that all 
reporting lines should go through this unit, for both non-financial and financial 
performance information. These units should also be responsible for giving feedback 
to entities (both from the Minister and based on their own critique of delivery status 
quo). 
 
Oversight is concerned with the reviewing, monitoring and overseeing of the affairs, 
practices, activities, behavior and conduct of the entities, in order to be satisfied that 
the affairs and business of the entities are being conducted in the manner expected 
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and in accordance with all normal commercial, legislative and other prescribed or 
agreed norms. This includes the review, monitoring and overseeing of the fact that 
the management of the entities, its strategic and business planning, its conduct of its 
business operations and its reporting thereon and accounting thereof, is being 
effectively managed by the entity’s executive management and staff and that the 
assets and goodwill are being properly protected and preserved. The Executive 
Authority’s corporate governance responsibility as shareholder, involves ensuring 
that, from the Board of directors downwards, and also in respect of accountability of 
the Board upwards to the shareholder, all the necessary and appropriate corporate 
governance structures, procedures, practices and controls and safeguards, are 
established, properly implemented and operate effectively in the entity concerned 8. 
 
The highlights of lessons from other countries have indicated a common need for a 
particular entity to account to a single Minister, and not to two or more. It is ‘good 
practice’ for there has  to be a one-to-one communication line between Government 
and entity, and that Government should be personalised by a single Minister who is 
accountable for all issues relating to that particular entity.  
 
                                                          
8
 Departments of Public Service Administration and National Treasury (2002) ‘Draft Framework 
on the Governance and Administration of Public Entities.’ 
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Although it is the prerogative of ‘politicians’ to change policies, when this happens too 
frequently, or when the changes are perceived to be arbitrary or unnecessary, it 
generates resistance. Therefore political continuity regarding the roles and 
functioning of entities is crucial to ensuring their efficiency and effectiveness (DPSA & 
NT: 2005). 
 
The inherent expectation by government is that public entities should exert social 
impact in delivering their mandates. Therefore the accounting authorities should carry 
out the mandates of these entities in such a manner as to ensure the increase of 
shareholder value as well as maximization of socio-political benefits in terms of the 
broader principles and policies of government. However, as a shareholder, 
government should ensure that its entities understand the respective policy 
imperatives for which mandates are to address for maximum achievements of 
delivery targets.  
 
Generally, measures and oversight instruments have been introduced to promote 
good governance and enhance oversight to the effect that in 1992 the institute of 
Directors initiated the establishment of a committee known as the King Committee 
aimed at interrogating corporate governance in the South African context. 
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Consequently, the committee institutionalised corporate governance by the 
publication of the King Report in November 1994.   
 
It promoted an integrative approach, which incorporated the interests of all 
stakeholders of an organisation and not only those of the shareholders. It drove 
home the notion that organisations should realise that their actions impacts on the 
society and the environment in which they operate. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Whilst there is sufficient literature on governance oversight in general, the literature 
survey also revealed that there are very limited empirical studies on the role of 
government departments on public entities under their control.  
 
However the literature review has assisted in enhancing understanding the research 
problem and the related questions. The literature has revealed that that there is an 
emphasis on oversight and accountability at the level of parliament. Automatically, 
this calls for the need to close this gap at the level of government departments, 
particularly those owning entities.  
 53 
 
For effective governance oversight on public entities the literature review has 
revealed critical areas requiring attention, such as the need for strong political and 
administrative oversight, accountability and managed relationship between the 
departments and entities. Literature has shown that these areas are calling for a 
fresher need to assess the effectiveness of current oversight mechanisms within 
government in general and at departmental level in particular.  Therefore the 
envisaged study moves from the premise that the degree of oversight by 
departments determines the functioning or malfunctioning of control mechanisms 
than the entities themselves.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The manner in which a research is designed manifest the manner in which the 
research is to be conducted. The primary purpose of a specific research design being 
to collect as much information as possible and to determine answers to the research 
questions so as to provide necessary information for decision-making (Malhota in 
Grobbelaar:2005).  This is confirmed by Mouton (2001) when he says that a research 
design is a plan or blue print of how you intend conducting the research.    
 
This research is qualitative. According to Levine (1998), a qualitative approach to 
research can yield new and exciting understandings, but it should not be undertaken 
because of a fear of quantitative research. The intention was to conduct a 
documentary analysis supplemented with small scale interviews of about two senior 
officials in charge of oversight in the Department of Human Settlements as well as six 
support staff members, the NHBRC Chief Executive Officer, Chairperson of the 
Council as well its Company Secretary.  
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Generally, the interviews focused on the oversight role of the NDoH over the NHBRC 
to determine any structural weaknesses in exercising its control over the entity. 
Moreover, the questions were posed to assess the department’s ability to conduct 
the necessary checks and balances with entities when required.   
 
3.2 Approach 
 
The research is envisaged to be exploratory. In the exploration, the researcher 
conducted an analysis of relevant documents about the NHBRC such as quarterly 
service delivery reports, annual reports, auditors’ reports, parliamentary oversight 
reports and reviewed other available literature on the subject. This was also 
complemented by drawing lessons from key studies underlining the subject matter. 
Bailey’s (1982:304-6) in Pohl (2001:8) argues that it is somewhat beneficial to use a 
documentary analysis approach in that there is easy accessibility of the subject 
matter which allows one to use studies undertaken elsewhere in the world.   
 
In considering the above, the researcher also took note of Bailey’s (1982:304-6) as 
well as Platt’s (1989:46) argument  that at times the use of documentary studies may 
disadvantage the researcher, some studies may have been  bias and might not have 
covered the same subject as the current study. The aim was to consider related 
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studies that only looked at the way government departments in South Africa and 
abroad have been exercising their oversight over their public entities, with particular 
reference to the systems and mechanisms employed in their oversight function. A 
comprehensive structured questionnaire was used for these interviews. As Cooper et 
al (1995) recommends, the questionnaire was pre tested to detect weaknesses and 
possible errors and to check if questions would derive relevant answers for the study. 
This was done with randomly chosen departmental officials and was found to be 
relevant for the study. 
 
3.3 The Scope of the study  
 
The study moves from the premise that the Department of Human Settlements has 
established a number of public entities with deferent mandates. However for the 
purpose of this study, focus was mainly on entities established by the National 
department of Human Settlements, with particular emphasis on the National Home 
Builders Registration Council (NHBRC). 
 
The NHBRC was established in terms of an Act of Parliament, which should facilitate  
easy oversight by the parent department on its service delivery and governance 
related matters. There has been a number of governance failures stemming from 
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lack or inability of the department to exercise adequate oversight which impact on 
service delivery or policy implementation by this entity. Therefore the aim was to 
focus on this entity with a view to derive lessons, the basis of which, will inform 
improvement/s required for effective oversight. 
 
3.4 Instruments for data collection: Interview and Documentary Analysis  
 
Substantial information from various reports on the topic was gathered to allow 
documentary and content analysis. These included departmental annual reports, 
entities quarterly performance reports and board meeting packs, reports from the 
Auditor General, Parliamentary Questions, Ministerial and Departmental letters.  As 
will be seen in subsequent chapters these documents formed the basis for the 
determination of any oversight weaknesses within the NDoHS. On the other hand 
Interviews with relevant officials formed the key mode of information gathering on key 
oversight activities and challenges experienced. A pre-prepared or structured 
questionnaire was used as a distinct tool for this purpose. The forgone 
instrumentation is briefly discussed below for in-depth understanding of the scope 
covered. 
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3.4.1 Document analysis  
 
Despite Mouton’s (2008:179) assertion that the use of literature reviews is a non-
empirical design classification, it was important to conduct a literature survey as the 
researcher was envisaging getting historical and recent information on issues and 
debates in this field as well as understanding the problem better. In this respect, 
books and articles on oversight, newspaper articles as well as information available 
on the government website were reviewed.  
 
Content analysis of historical (dating back to 2005) and recent Strategic Plans of this 
entity as well as its Annual reports for the same period was undertaken. These 
included Auditor General Reports as well as Parliamentary briefings and related 
questions.  
 
For the purpose of this study, it was critical to prioritise documentation coming from 
statutory institutions such as the Auditor General and Parliament, These included 
audit queries and parliamentary questions and parliamentary briefings. 
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3.4.2 Interviews 
 
As highlighted above, the interview technique was a very key method for gathering 
the required information. For this purpose, it was important to conduct interviews with 
a sample of eight key individuals charged with accountability within the NHBRC and 
the National Department of Human Settlements.  Therefore the NHBRC Chairperson 
of Council, CEO as well as the Company Secretary were interviewed. As part 
processes of the interviews certain documents such as board meeting packs and 
minutes, were requested (where possible). Information emanating from board packs 
was used to ascertain if all board decisions were supportive to the mandate of the 
organisation.  
 
Furthermore and flowing from information extracted from these reports, additional 
information was gathered through interviews with the Deputy Director General and 
the Chief Director in charge of  public entities oversight in the Department of Human 
Settlements. It was also critical to engage officials from both external auditors of this 
entity and officials from the Auditor General to determine the extent of their discovery 
of malfunctioning and or in adequate departmental oversight.   
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Interviews were also conducted with experts in government with a view to draw 
comprehensive understanding of governance oversight.   
 
3.5  Verification of data collected  
 
Guion (2002) describes validity, in qualitative research, as a phenomenon that 
relates to whether the findings of your study are true and certain.  
- "True" in the sense of your findings accurately reflecting the real situation. 
- "Certain" in the sense of your findings being backed by evidence. 
- “Certain” means that there are no good grounds for doubting the results; 
i.e. the weight of evidence supports your conclusions. 
The verification of data was a challenging activity in that it required an intense cross 
referencing exercise.  For the credibility of this research, it was critical that empirical 
evidence be gathered.  It was therefore critical to interview external auditors, and 
officials from the Auditor General following engagements with the NHBRC Board 
Chairperson and the CEO. Furthermore, this was complemented by a content 
analysis of Annual Reports, Strategic Corporate Reports, management reports and 
press releases. 
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For purposes of verifying collected data, data triangulation was applied. The 
researcher opted for this type of triangulation because it was most relevant for this 
study and mostly it is the popular and easiest to implement. Denzil (1989) simplified it 
and described three types of data triangulation (Time, space and person) and for the 
purpose of this study a key strategy was to apply a ‘person triangulation’ to allow for a 
comparable the evaluation of data collected.  Furthermore, using this type of 
triangulation allowed the researcher to collect information from more than one level of 
persons i.e a set of individuals, groups or collective.   
 
A comparable number of people from each information group was then included and 
in-depth interviews were conducted to gain insight on what the individuals perceived 
as control measures of oversight, outcomes of oversight and required mechanisms 
for effective oversight.  Measures and outcomes that are agreed upon by all 
informants were triangulated and the weight of evidence determined the validity of 
the outcome. The belief is that informants were looking at issues from different points 
of view. This also covers experts or critical stakeholders such as the Auditor General. 
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3.6  Data analysis, interpretation and presentation  
 
Due to the nature of the study and the sample size of the research informants, no 
sophisticated statistical software package was used. However for the purpose of 
presenting the findings of this research it was important to conduct a desktop 
analysis of collected data.  
 
Analyzing collected data consists of a number of interrelated processes that are 
intended to summarize, arrange, and transform data into information. At this critical 
stage, it was important to revisit the objective/s of the research to proper analysis and 
interpretation. It was therefore important to transform the raw results in to information 
that will enable you to paint a clear picture of the challenges impeding on the 
Department of Human Settlements’ oversight over its entities. 
 
The process of analyzing collected data began with a quick review of the results, 
followed by editing, analysis, and reporting.  
 Quick Review: Although a the questionnaire tested/piloted before put into use 
it was critical to conduct a quick review of results to determine any flaws in the 
questionnaire design or response population, before data analysis. Secondly, 
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the idea was also to see if the results "made sense".  This also assisted in 
depicting critical areas to focus on for detailed analysis. 
 Editing and Cleaning: This was the second critical step to undertake. Special 
care was taken when editing collected data to avoid any alteration or throwing 
out of responses. This was critical to avoid biasness of results. 
 Detailed Analysis: This being the most critical aspect of the research project, 
considerable time was allocated for proper analysis. The type of analysis 
chosen and that made sense for the study was a simple in-depth comparison 
between questions sets to identify trends and themes. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this study basic analysis using cross tabulations was sufficient to 
enhance readability and understanding.  
 Reporting: This comprehensive report details the findings and 
recommendations as compiled in Microsoft word format.  As detailed, the 
report reviews the research objective to elicit understanding of what the 
research is all about. Actual analysis, conclusions and recommendations that 
relate back to the research objectives are included.  
 
Having followed the envisaged research approach, the next chapter  provides in 
detail, the findings of the researcher project.  The findings exposes, amongst other 
things, the results of the engagements between the researcher and the officials 
 64 
charged with oversight responsibility at the National Department of Human 
Settlements.  Notably, the findings share some light into the oversight control 
measures and mechanism used by NDHS for ensuring good governance and 
effective policy implementation. Critical to the findings are the challenges facing the 
department in its role as the overseer of its entity.   
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
5.1 Introduction and Background  
 
As envisaged, the research was exploratory and documents about the NHBRC were 
explored, interrogated and analysed. This included the interrogation of accountability 
documents such as quarterly service delivery reports, annual reports, auditors’ 
reports as well as parliamentary oversight reports, board meetings packs (including 
minutes), Ministerial and Departmental correspondences. Substantial information 
was gathered from the aforementioned documents and documentary and content 
analysis was conducted.  
 
In addition, face to face interviews with relevant informants in and outside the 
department, formed the key mode of information gathering. A pre-prepared or 
structured questionnaire was used as a distinct tool for this purpose (attached 
herewith as Annexure A). The specifications of interviews conducted are hereunder 
briefly discussed for an in-depth understanding of the sources of information. 
 
 
 66 
(a) Chief Executive Officer of NHBRC 
As will be noted later in the document, a face to face interview with Mr Sipho 
Mashinini, CEO of NHBRC conducted  in the offices of NHBRC shared light 
on NHBRC’s organisational perspective on the oversight role of  its parent 
department and observed weaknesses. This interview was highly critical for 
the research. 
(b) Deputy Director General (former) in charge of Public Entities  
The second interviewee was Mr Joseph Leshabane, former Deputy Director 
General of the Department of Human Settlements. It was critical to get an 
independent perspective in this subject from a former senior official of the 
department who was the head of the oversight business unit.  As will be noted 
later in the document, this interview provided an invaluable insight on areas of 
strength and weaknesses of the department. It was fulfilling to such 
information from someone who shared information from a detached position.   
(c) Acting Chief Director: Entities Governance Oversight 
Mr Morris Mngomezulu is in charge of entities oversight in the Department of 
Human Settlements as an acting Chief Director. The interview with him was 
conducted on 18 February 2011 in his office. The interview also provided 
critical information, particularly in respect of challenges faced by the 
department and the business unit he is in charge of in particular. 
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The following departmental officials could not avail themselves for face to face 
interviews but managed to complete the questionnaire: 
(i) Mr Jan Maritz - Deputy Director: Financial Monitoring  
(ii) Ms Kgaugelo Sehlapelo – Chief Planner Finance  
(iii) Mr James Dlamini – Chief Planner Corporate Governance 
(iv) Mr Solly Mabasa  - Deputy Director Policy Advocacy 
(v) Mr Phillip Phaahla – Chief Planner Financial monitoring  
(vi) Ms Anna Mokgadinyane – Chief Planner Corporate Planning Support  
 
Historical information indicate that for a number of years the quality failures 
encountered in some of the houses built through the National Housing Subsidy 
Programme have been receiving increased attention. Several stakeholders (including 
Cabinet, MinMec (Minister and MECs Committee), Parliament, Auditor General, 
National Treasury and the media) have in different ways brought the quality failures 
into the spotlight. Their concerns varied from value for money questions, violation of 
beneficiary rights and the need for better quality control systems and accountability 
for such quality failures. Furthermore subsidy houses are financed through the 
integrated Housing and Human Settlements Development Grant that is administered 
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by the Director General as the ‘National Transferring Officer” in terms of the Division 
of Revenue Act (DORA).  
 
In 2002 NHBRC’s mandate was extended to include the government subsidy market. 
Three years after, NHBRC could only enrol 188 projects in principle, which consist of 
230995 units, out of this, 54 projects were enrolled totalling 73153 units and lastly 22 
projects qualified for home enrolment totalling 25933. In effect, for three years, the 
NHBRC approved the building and construction of 25933 government subsidised 
houses nationally without issuing a certificate of enrolment to one single house. The 
certificate of enrolment confirms that all quality measures have been complied with.  
 
Furthermore, according to the ABC of Housing Stats of September 2005, 724 164 
houses where recorded as complete and still under construction for the period 1 April 
2002 to 31 September 2005.  It is not clear whether the Provincial Housing 
Departments and Municipalities were reporting or not reporting projects to NHBRC 
as expected. Whichever case may be, this amounted to the contravention of the Act 
and as a consequence deprives the deserving nation decent quality housing. 
According to NHBRC this was fuelled by the fact that provinces have not been 
forthcoming to enrol housing projects and units with the NHBRC for structural 
warranty cover and general consumer protection as prescribed by the Act. Despite 
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being empowered by the Act, NHBRC’s attempts to enforce compliance by Provincial 
Housing Departments have met with complications in the intergovernmental context 
to an extent of political interference. Moreover, provinces have not internalised and 
therefore acknowledged the value for NHBRC’s involvement in the project delivery 
chain. 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive detail of the results of this study. It is critical 
at this point, to remind the reader that the purpose of this study was to determine 
challenges impacting on the oversight function of the department on NHBRC and 
investigate  the functionality of the existing departmental oversight systems and 
mechanisms. 
 
The chapter is organized into three major sections and themes. The first section 
presents the results on Theme 1: Governance and Service Delivery, the second 
section present the results on Theme 2: Oversight and accountability and the third 
section presents the results on Theme 3: Strong political and administrative 
oversight. Each section provides the reader with a description of findings from 
interactions with informants and an evaluation of what would work well and what 
would not. Additionally, each section includes tentative recommendations for 
improving oversight within the context of this study.  
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5.2 Theme 1: Governance and Service Delivery 
 
Key Findings 
The study has revealed that there is a correlation between good governance and 
service delivery. Information derived from an investigative study commissioned by 
the National Department of Human Settlements during 2009 seems to support this 
notion. The said study was on quality assurance, in which a local authority and a 
provincial authority in the Gauteng Province identified gaps and challenges requiring 
attention, particularly, on quality assurance (service delivery expectation on NHBRC).  
 
The study revealed that there is currently no framework in South Africa to ensure that 
those who conduct inspections to ensure quality houses/homes are sufficiently skilled 
and knowledgeable in the built environment and can be trusted by all the 
stakeholders to protect their interest, while most importantly ensuring that the quality 
standards are complied with. 
 
Whilst the study discovered that there are clear lines of accountability regarding the 
final responsibility for the quality of materials used in housing delivery with the SABS, 
NHBRC and the Agrément Board of SA, the same cannot be said on quality 
 71 
assurance and control processes when it comes to monitoring and certifying quality 
on state funded housing units.  
 
Various stakeholders with varied developmental requirements are involved in the 
quality assurance exercised during housing delivery. In the interview with the CEO of 
NHBRC, it was confirmed that there is no coordination of role players in the housing 
sector when it comes to the element of quality assurance.  It goes without saying that 
the NHBRC’s quality assurance work is thorough and comprehensive, with clear 
building quality index reports issued for each enrolled house that gets built. However, 
the challenge is who acts on the findings of the reports that are issued by the 
NHBRC? The other problem is that the NHBRC reports  seems to focus on samples, 
meaning that not all the housing units developed in particular development get the 
necessary attention. This is where a huge gap has ensued.  
 
The above coordination hurdle undermines the financial contribution made by the 
public through the enrolment of homes and projects for an insurance cover for a 
defined period. For instance, the financial statements made public in 2008, revealed 
that the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) had in excess of 
R2,5-billion invested. Yet only R4,5-million was spent that year to remedy defects. It 
has been discovered from documents reviewed regarding public complaints against 
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the NHBRC that are received by the Department that the public is already calling for 
the review of the NHBRC. The public is worried about the amount accruing from 
interest alone on the funds this entity holds.  One developer (Rabie Property Group) 
is alleged to have paid in excess of R40-million since 2003 to the NHBRC for which it 
has received little or no benefit. This is partly due to capacity constrained of the 
provincial offices of the NHBRC as well as laxity in corporate governance issues on 
the part of inspectors.  As a result, warning signals for an imminent organizational 
collapse ensued as complaints skyrocketed.  
 
The Department commissioned another study to detect key risky areas and activities 
within the NHBRC.  From the findings of the said study very serious and drastic 
inferences could be made against the Department’s oversight role, particularly its 
ability (approach) and capacity (in terms of systems and mechanisms employed) to 
effectively monitor the NHBRC.  
 
The study also revealed that the NHBRC, as an organization, is clear of what is 
expected of it in terms of its mandate of regulating and providing quality assurance 
for the home building industry. In addition, the interview with the Accounting Officer 
(CEO of NHBRC) confirmed that there is a general inference that the NHBRC directly 
supports the strategic intent of its parent department (the NDoHS). However, the 
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governance relations is not intact in that it appears that the entity is not sure if the 
parent department (Department of Human Settlements) is fully exploiting the 
potential within the NHBRC to achieve ‘what it intends to achieve’- its strategic vision 
on human settlements.  For instance, the notion that there seems to be no alignment 
between the strategic intent at provincial level in terms of delivery of quality human 
settlements “….these spheres of government look like different organization that 
happen to collaborate in the delivery of housing by default’. 
 
Whilst the National Department of Human Settlements seems to be holding the purse 
(through grant funding) for the delivery of housing in the country via provinces, it 
appears that there is very minimal influence that this sphere of government at the 
provincial level has particularly on ensuring quality housing delivery. Politically, not all 
provinces share the same passion and zeal to deliver in collaboration with the 
NHBRC, particularly, when it comes to compliance to its quality assurance 
requirements.   
 
This is aggravated by the fact that entities such as the NHBRC which are expected to 
support government at national level to realize its objective of delivering sustainable 
human settlements that are of quality standard, feel aggrieved by the so called 
“…..invisible or hopeless oversight”.  According to the information received, at the 
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time of this study (1 year six months after the new administration was instituted), the 
Minister was yet to meet his entities (one on one with his accounting authorities and 
share his vision and delivery expectations.  The NHBRC do not know if they are on 
the right track or not.  On the other hand, the Council Advisory Committee constituted 
in terms of the Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act of 1998 to advise the 
Minister on possible alternative insurance for the home building industry has failed to 
submit proposals to introduce outside insurers in 2003 which it should have done.  
 
It appears that the element of vigour is absent and therefore there is no vigilance on 
the part of the department on what needs to be done. There is more emphasis on 
checklist on compliance (interview with the CEO, NHBRC). The feeling is that there is 
a dire need to shift from paper based oversight (reliance on quarterly reports) to 
visible constructive engagements such as shareholder representation at Board level. 
One typical example mentioned relates to procurement where the extension of an 
inspection contract by the Board to one of the service providers was done outside 
procurement regime. Despite the absence of representation at the board level, from 
the oversight perspective, the department has not requested any minutes of the 
board meetings follow through on governance matters.  
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5.3 Theme 2: Oversight and Accountability  
 
Key Findings  
NHBRC has since 2007 been experiencing internal operational difficulties. 
Symptomatic to these problems have been the inability of this entity to submit Annual 
Reports to Parliament on time in the past years. In terms of the Public Service 
Management Act, 1999 (Act No.1 of 1999) non adherence to deadlines contravenes 
the Act. At some point, the Board had to suspend its Chief Executive Officer.  
 
The governance glitch within NHBRC sparked an outcry in the circles of government 
particularly National Treasury and Parliament, questioning the ability of the 
Department of Human Settlements’ capacity and ability in respect of its oversight.    
 
The review of a report on a study commissioned by the Department to conduct an 
organization wide diagnosis to determine the health of this organisation unearthed 
critical governance challenges. The Department’s primary concern was to foresee 
and prevent or minimize service delivery collapse on the part of the NHBRC following 
the hint from a number of complaints received from the public.  The study 
ascertained the extent of the problems and determined if the entity is fit for purpose 
with respect to its service delivery objectives. Broadly, the Department’s expectation 
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was that the organizational diagnosis would determine the health of the NHBRC and 
its ability to fulfil its legislated functions. Stakeholders such as builders, technical 
service providers, Provincial Human Settlements Departments, previous Council 
members and staff were interviewed.  According to the report, following this 
assignment, it was discovered that there was role confusion that led to poor 
accountability and delayed responsibility. By legislation and practice, the Council is 
structured as a board but has the responsibility of an executive.  
 
This ignited an interest to review Board meeting packs for the year ending March 
2009. This review revealed elements of dysfunctionality within the Board, - something 
which could not be picked by the shareholder in its oversight management role.  
Some of the things discovered include, 
 
(a) All work is done in the name of the Council  
 
On reviewing the 2008 Annual Report, it was discovered that the Council is sited as 
the accounting authority in the 2008 annual report. Whilst this is correct in that the 
Council as the final decision making authority and governing Board gets involved in 
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operational detail. This over-involvement of the Council is a serious corporate 
governance matter because it tempers with the day to day operations of the entity. 
 
 (b) Council has 11 committees  
 
The Council has 11 committees and several task teams to engage, direct and review 
work. However, the Council decisions are deferred for more than a year due to 
inadequate information and/or committee review. In the process the Executive 
directors get freed from final accountability and responsibility lacks clarity. As a result 
when proposals get tabled at the Council, it happens without any cross functional 
review and impact analysis. This shows an element of a lack of an integrated and 
unified work style 
 
(c) Shareholder representation within the governance structure of NHBRC  
 
The responsibility of appointing board members of housing entities lies with the 
Minister of Human Settlements particularly where there is an enabling legislation 
pointing to that effect. This is the case with the NHBRC.  
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The fact that the NHBRC is a public entity for whose performance the Executive 
Authority, in this case the Minister of Human Settlements is accountable to 
Parliament should be represented at board level. However this is not the case at the 
NHBRC.  
 
The stance has always been that the National Department is a shareholder to and 
plays an oversight role over its entities in general. The Department’s relationship with 
its entities is set out in a shareholders compact which is an agreement between the 
Minister and the board of an entity which describes the relationship between the 
parties.  
 
A quick look at the fiduciary duties of board members, it is critical to note that the 
most fiduciary duties are that they must, 
 
(i) Act independently at all times with unfettered discretion;  
(ii) Exercise independent judgment; and  
(iii) Take decisions according to the best interest of the institution.  
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Playing an oversight role over an institution while also occupying the position of a 
board member undoubtedly constitutes a conflict of interest. 
 
This kind of conflict is clearly set out in a reported judgment of Fisheries 
Development Cop of SA v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W)  where it 
was held that “the director’s duty is to observe utmost good faith towards the 
company, and in discharging that duty he is required to exercise an independent 
judgment and to take decisions according to the best interests of the company as his 
principal. He may in fact be representing the interests of the person nominating him, 
and he may even be the servant or agent of that person, but, in carrying out his 
duties and functions as a director, he is in law obliged to serve the interests of the 
company to the exclusion of any such nominator, employer or principal……he cannot 
be subject to the control of any employer or principal other than the company” 
 
The King Report II also describes this kind of independence as follows: 
“Independence is the extent to which mechanisms have been put in place to 
minimize or avoid potential conflicts of interests that may exist, such as dominance 
by a strong chief executive or large shareholder. These mechanisms range from the 
composition of the board, to appointments in committees of the board, and of 
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external parties such as the auditors. The decisions made, and internal processes 
established should be objective and not allow for undue influences”.  
 
One of the most serious implications for being a board member is one of being 
personally liable in terms of damages and criminal liability arising out of breach of 
fiduciary duties. In terms of both the Companies Act and the PFMA, board members’ 
liability is unlimited is that they can be suit personally. They are jointly and severally 
liable for any breach of fiduciary duties. 
 
It then becomes too risky for public service officials appointed as board members to 
remain independent in view of their official duties to their employers and Executive 
Authorities. Despite the above rationale, this is a critical governance matter that has a 
bearing on oversight and accountability.  
 
One of the key challenges discovered in this study is that here is role confusion 
between the Council and the Executive Management of NHBRC. It was discovered 
that the Council, as the final decision making authority, gets involved in operational 
decision making, thus delaying implementation. This element may be attributed to the 
governance anomaly where structurally the Council is positioned to be the board but 
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has the responsibility of an executive. For an example, the Council has eleven 
committees and several task teams to engage, direct and review work in the Council. 
Council decisions are deferred for more than a year due to inadequate information 
and/or committee review. As a result officials who are supposed to be taking 
responsibility and accountability (Executive directors) end up freed from final 
accountability.  The fact that proposals are tabled to the Council without cross 
functional review and impact analysis depicts the dysfunctionality at executive level. 
 
The lack of precision within the governing Board reflects the need to close the gap on 
shareholder representation at the Board level. It follows that shareholder 
representation would improve board performance especially when there is a potential 
risk of not achieving the board’s goals or properly carrying out the board’s basic 
functions.  An interview conducted with the Chief Executive Officer of the NHBRC 
also revealed the necessity of stakeholder representation. He indicated that interest 
departments such as Public Works, Trade and Industry need to be represented. He 
indicated that representation from the shareholder should not be negotiable.   He 
emphasised that where officials are in the board as observers to explain matters 
such as government or departmental policy and direction, this will filter through and 
strengthen strategic leadership at the NHBRC. 
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Customer service orientation is deficient in the organization. Mechanisms to establish 
a stakeholder management capability do not exist. Customer satisfaction is 
addressed only when crises arise, indicative of poor planning. 
 
5.4 Theme 3: Strong Administrative and Political Oversight  
 
Key Findings  
Literature has revealed that oversight is conducted from three different perspectives, 
namely Administrative (technocratic) oversight, and Political (Executive) oversight, as 
well as Political oversight from the perspective of opposition parties. For adequate 
accountability, it is emphasised that oversight within these layers or levels should be 
strong.  
 
The researcher interviewed officials of the Department whose responsibility is to 
overseer NHBRC as it delivers on its mandate.    
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(i) Administrative oversight 
  
Administratively, the National Department of Human Settlements has in place 
oversight systems and mechanisms to ensure that its entities implement 
policy/mandate in a manner that contributes to its strategic goals. The study 
discovered that the administrative oversight of the department is relatively strong. 
From the interview with the CEO of NHBRC, there was a clear indication that the 
administrative oversight systems and mechanisms put in place by the department 
are satisfactorily.  
 
In terms of the organisational structure, a dedicated division at Chief Directorate level 
has been established. According to the 2009 Annual Report, the main purpose of this 
division is to provide oversight management to entities reporting to the Ministry of 
Human Settlements.  
 
The main mechanisms used by the department to exercise oversight are guided by 
the applicable legislations such as own entity legislation, the PFMA, Companies Act, 
King Code, Protocol on Corporative Governance, and other relevant guidelines. Such 
mechanism find expression in a Entities Monitoring Framework approved by 
STRATMAN (an departmental high decision making structure), 
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Mainly, the following are used: 
 
 Business Corporate Plans 
 
The accounting authority for a public entity must at least six months before the start 
of the year, or another period as agreed to between the executive authority and the 
public entity, submit a budget of estimated revenue and expenditure for approval by 
the executive authority in terms of section 53 (1) & (2) of the PFMA. 
 
The Department participates in the strategic planning activities of the public entities 
so as to facilitate alignment of their programmes to the national policies and priorities 
with a view of achieving pursuance of the National Department’s mandate by the 
public entities, and to agree on the allocation of the appropriated funding to those 
programmes to ensure transparency and accountability for the use of public funds. 
This is followed by submission of draft and final strategic plans and budgets by the 
30th of  September (a date which is 6 months before the start of the year for which the 
strategic plan is prepared) 1st April each year respectively.  
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Service delivery targets (both non financial and financial) should find expression in a 
service level agreement between the Executive Authority (the Minister) and the entity 
and ensure that it describes the  behaviour expected on both sides to support 
effective management and performance of the entity.  
 
 Quarterly Performance Reports 
 
Entities, through accounting officers, submit quarterly reports on their actual revenue 
and expenditure up to the end of the quarter as well as a projection of expected 
revenue and expenditure for the remainder of the current financial year within thirty 
days of the end of each quarter.  In addition, Treasury Regulations stipulates that the 
accounting authority must quarterly report to the executive authority through the 
designated accounting officer on the extent of compliance on the Public Finance 
Management Act, 1999 and regulations. Any non-compliance must be reported 
together with reasons for the non-compliance. 
 
In this regards, the Department’s role is always to ensure that the quarterly reports 
are drafted in terms of the required format as prescribed above and that time frames 
are adhered to.  
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According to the Department’s monitoring framework, these reports are used to 
monitor and assess whether:  
 
 Performance is in line with the Business Plan and mandate  
 The entity is on course or not achieving the targets in terms of their 
business plan 
 Expenditure of the entity is within the budget parameters and expenditure 
relating to the mandate and approved objectives of the entity. 
 Governance Structures, including procedures and policies, are in place 
and operational 
 Entities do not deviate from its mandate 
 
 Midterm Review  
 
The department conducts midyear performance reviews with its entities in November 
of every year. These reviews take into account the performance of entities for the 
preceding two quarters (i.e. April to September). The expectation is that these 
reviews should provide the Department an opportunity to review progress in policy 
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implementation, implementation challenges experienced by entities, and jointly agree 
with entities on solutions.  
 
 Oversight visits to entities  
 
The Department also conducts periodic visits to entities in order to engage the 
executive management on salient issues emanating and observed from quarterly 
reports. It is believed that these visits also assist the Department to communicate 
matters of concern and Ministerial priorities. 
 
 Annual reports  
 
The Accounting Authority (the governing Board) for a public entity must submit its 
Annual Report within five months after the end of the financial year. The annual 
report should comprehensively disclose the public entity’s strategic objectives and 
outcomes as identified and agreed on by the executive authority, the key 
performance measures and indicators for assessing the entity’s performance in 
delivering the desired outcomes and objectives and the entity’s actual performance 
against the strategic objectives and outcomes.  
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 Service Level Agreement or Shareholder Compact 
 
An audit query from the Auditor General in 2006 discovered that the department 
does not enter into any form of service level agreement with its entities and 
recommended that the department should initiate a process and develop a generic 
shareholder framework.  
 
Following this recommendation, a framework was developed and approved by 
STRATMAN, expectation of which was that the Executive Authority (Minister of 
Human Settlements) would enter into a service delivery agreement on behalf of the 
State as a Shareholder with the Chairpersons of the Board as an accounting 
authority of an entity. 
 
The service delivery agreement should document key performance measures and 
indicators to be attained by the public entity, and is used by the Board of Directors to 
guide the company and its strategy formulation and implementation.  It is envisaged 
that this should provide clarity about the expectations of the State as a shareholder in 
terms of service delivery, government priorities etc. 
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In respect of the effectiveness of the above systems and mechanisms of oversight, 
indication (90% of the respondents) is that these systems are somewhat effective in 
that there are constant engagements with entities through the periodic submission of 
reports. However, indication was that the current oversight systems have a 
disadvantage in that they promote usage of an invisible ‘remote control’ on entities by 
officials –a phenomenon that is seen as ineffective.  Though the NHBRC submits 
reports, and there is feedback from the department, the senior executives are not 
sure if government officials do follow up on salient issues raised in eth reports.  
 
One of the means and ways for the department to engage with the NHBRC is 
through the midyear performance review held once a year around November of 
every year. Documentation reviewed has indicated that these reviews should 
normally be attended by top management of the department. The expectation is that 
these reviews should be providing the Department an opportunity to review progress 
in policy implementation, review and, where necessary, align the entity’s strategies 
with new policy developments and direction. Furthermore this also presents both the 
department and NHBRC with an opportunity to explore mitigating measures to 
alleviate policy implementation challenges. Jointly agree with entities on solutions. 
However, in the past three years, attendance of the department’s top management 
has been deteriorating, the worst being 2010 where none of the Deputy Director 
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Generals were present –let alone Chief Directors. This is sending wrong signals to 
the entities. Although only the NHBRC Executive/s was interviewed in this study, an 
inference could be made that this is a strategic drawback that affects all other 
entities. 
 
In respect of compliance to relevant legislations it was discovered that the Office of 
the Auditor General had given three consecutive unqualified audit reports in the past 
three years. It should be borne in mind that the Office of the Auditor General invites 
itself to conduct audits on any public entity. The independent audit of the Office of the 
Auditor General has confirmed to the public that NHBRC is properly managed. The 
increase in both home enrolment and registration of homebuilders demonstrates 
public confidence. 
 
An enquiry from the Rapport newspaper insinuated that there is a decision gap at the 
Board level when it comes to deciding what and how the remuneration of staff should 
be paid due to the absence of the Council and the Remuneration Committee. 
However it has been discovered that in the absence of Council and a Remuneration 
Committee, new staff continued to be remunerated in accordance with existing salary 
grades. In terms of annual salary increases, annual performance bonuses for staff 
including Executive Management, the National Department of Housing gave 
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approval in line with the submissions from NHBRC, taking into cognisance outcomes 
of the Performance Management System. The approval for 2004/5 was on 29 June 
2005 and, 2005/6 approvals were on 12 April 2006.  
 
Administratively, the above finding shares some light in respect of NHBRC 
compliance. Inference could be made that the Auditor General’s reports reflect 
positively on the department’s enforcement and oversight.   
 
(ii)  Political oversight  
 
The study has found that political oversight is divided into two levels, firstly, political 
oversight is exercised by the political head of the department who accounts to 
Parliament on the affairs of all entities reporting under his/her department. Normally, 
the political head accounts through Annual Reports tabled in Parliament within six 
months after the end of the financial year. Secondly, political oversight is also 
exercised by a dedicated Parliamentary Portfolio Committee which comprises of 
members from both the ruling party and the opposition. Periodical and as in when it 
feels so, the Portfolio Committee can either invite a public entity to account on a 
matter of interest.  
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Shareholder expectation should find expression in the Service Level Agreement or 
Shareholders’ Compact. However, it study has discovered that it has been difficult for 
the department to get the Executive Authority to sign these document. Although the 
NHBRC has been submitting its draft Service Level Agreement signed by the 
Chairperson of the Council for the past three years,    none of these were 
countersigned by the Executive Authority. It is not clear what has been preventing the 
Executive Authority to sign. It could be concluded however that there are varied 
levels of understanding in regard to the relevance of these documents between the 
Ministry and its administrative wing (the Department). 
 
As per statutory requirement, the Portfolio Committee on Housing (Human 
Settlements) in Parliament received NHBRC’s Annual Reports for the 2006/7, 2007/8 
and 2008/9. However these reports were submitted to Parliament without the 
Executive Authority or even the Director General having endorsed.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter consists of a summary, conclusion and recommendations for further 
research. In broad terms, the research paper determined challenges impacting on 
the Department of Human Settlements’ oversight role over NHBRC in the area of 
policy implementation and accountability. Furthermore this research explored the 
possibility of developing effective mechanisms to enhance the Department’s 
oversight.  
 
Literature on governance oversight in general is adequate, however the study also 
revealed that there are very limited empirical studies on the role of government 
departments on public entities under their control. At present, the concept of 
‘oversight’ is generally conceived in terms of the implicitly proactive ‘watch-dog’ role 
to be played by an elected legislative assembly towards the activities and functions of 
the executive and administrative arms of government. It is testimony to the currency 
of the term in political thought that, as yet, no definitions of it appear in dictionaries of 
political terminology.  
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As seen in the report, the literature survey conducted for the purpose of this study 
revealed that oversight on entities is a new and a growing phenomenon particularly 
at the departmental level. Not only did the literature assisted in understanding this 
new concept but also assisted in unpacking the research problem and the related 
questions for this study.  
 
The study revealed that there should be balance between the oversight and 
accountability processes at the level of parliament and those at departmental level (or 
administrative level).  This study emphasized of the need to close this gap at the level 
of government departments, particularly those owning entities.   
 
For effective governance oversight on public entities the literature review has 
revealed critical areas requiring attention, such as the need for strong political and 
administrative oversight, accountability and managed relationship between the 
departments and entities. Literature has shown that these areas are calling for a 
fresher need to assess the effectiveness of current oversight mechanisms within 
government in general and at departmental level in particular.  Therefore the 
envisaged study moved from the premise that the degree of oversight by 
departments determines the functioning or malfunctioning of control mechanisms 
than the entities themselves.  
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In conclusion, it should be noted that, in general, the study agrees with the notion that 
the rationale for establishing entities outside parent departments is that certain 
services could be more efficiently and cost-effectively undertaken in specialised 
environments by professionally-managed, arms-length agencies functioning on 
commercial principles.  
 
However, the Executive Authority (EA), and as the owner/shareholder in public 
entities, should be concerned with policy implementation of service delivery and 
should act as a regulator.  The relationship should be such that government is able to 
control and manage its involvement (by virtue of its investment) without negatively 
impacting on the independence of the accounting authorities (the Boards of 
Directors) and without getting involved in the day to day management of its entities.  
Notwithstanding the above, the arms length relationship between those entrusted 
with oversight responsibility and the   governing boards who are the accounting 
authorities of these entities has a potential risk of creating a control gap for 
government and stifling service delivery and the associated social benefits.  It is 
important that the principles of good governance in public entities be applied to 
determine the efficiency of decision-making bodies in achieving the objectives in 
terms of their fiduciary duties. Therefore for oversight to be effective, whether at 
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administrative or political level, it is critical that government (as owner) should clearly 
describe its role particularly its governance relationship with its entities . 
 
6.1.1 Current situation  
 
The National Department of Human Settlements and its oversight management is 
currently structured at the Chief Directorate level with two directorates one dealing 
with the performance of entities in respect of financial and non financial matters and 
the other dealing with corporate governance issues.  
 
The staff complement of this business unit is 20 but at the time of this study there 
were two critical vacancies at Chief Director and Director Levels.  As set back for 
effective oversight. The oversight function conducted through this business unit 
spread over two directorates functions of which are entirely informed by legislative 
frameworks such as the PFMA.  
 
The study unveiled that whilst the above legislative arrangements for discharging 
oversight responsibilities is not without drawbacks. In some cases, it leads possibly to 
overlapping consideration of the same oversight items or reports by different divisions 
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or business units in the department. There are divergent views and conclusions at 
the strategic level requiring additional considerations beyond the scope of this study.  
 
However from the department’s oversight approach it could be concluded that where 
there is only one standing oversight division with clear role and uninterrupted function 
oversight become meaningful. The advantage afforded by this approach that the 
shortcomings noted above can be avoided. Notwithstanding the above notion 
effective exercise of oversight responsibility could still be inhibited if the authority of 
the “officials entrusted with oversight responsibility” is not comprehensive enough to 
address all pertinent aspects of the oversight function, including compliance issues 
and linkages to the programme budgeting and management improvement 
processes. 
 
From the Executive Authority accountability point of view, Ministers are traditionally 
accountable for both the policy and management of their departments as well as 
policy implementation by their statutory agencies9. The growth of the public service 
has meant that Ministers cannot be expected to have knowledge of all the workings 
of their departments and its entities. However, as Corder et al (1999) puts it, it is true 
to say that in terms of the doctrine Ministers can be expected to put in place systems 
                                                          
9 J Jowell & D Oliver (1989) in Corder et al (1999). 
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and procedures to ensure proper management and the efficient utilisation of 
resources allocated to their departments including those of its entities. Ministerial 
responsibility is the cornerstone of accountability.  
 
However, since it is based on departmental hierarchy and lines of responsibility 
culminating in the Ministers, it proves far less useful when the element of the 
executive in question consists of statutory bodies or agencies which are outside the 
departmental sphere of control.  
 
In the context of this Department, it is clear that the ministerial responsibility over the 
NHBRC has been stretched to the limit. Generally, an aspect of the problem is that 
while ministers can in the face of developments disclaim responsibility in many 
instances, the traditional doctrine also excludes public servants from responsibility.  
 
In this instance, Corder et al (1999) made a comparison of constitutions in other parts 
of the world to assist in understanding the above dichotomy. Internationally, different 
countries and nations’ expectations in this area of political accountability varies: 
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United Kingdom: As part of the responsibility of ministers to Parliament there exists 
the convention of impartial, non-political civil servants who are not directly 
accountable to Parliament; accountability takes place through the minister 
concerned. As a consequence civil servants can refuse to answer questions about 
advice to ministers on policy or their opinion on policy10. However, the realisation that 
policy and policy-making is difficult to separate from administration has led to 
increased efforts to hold civil servants responsible. With regard to executive agencies 
the Public Service Committee of the House of Commons has stated that a minister’s 
duty to give an account can be delegated to the chief executive of the agency in 
question, but ‘the liability to be held to account…cannot’11. Therefore ministers must 
take steps to correct the failings of executive agencies revealed by parliamentary 
scrutiny.  
 
Canada: The political neutrality of civil servants and ministerial responsibility means 
that the British model is followed. By convention civil servants remain anonymous in 
the sense that they should not be criticized personally or otherwise held accountable 
in Parliament12. 
                                                          
10 C Turpin ‘Ministerial Responsibility’ 53 at 65 in J Jowell & D Oliver The Changing Constitution (1989). 
11 M Radford ‘Mitigating the Democratic Deficit? Judicial Review and Ministerial Accountability’ 35 to 40 
in P Leyland & T Woods Administrative Law Facing the Future (1997). 
12 P W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed) 1992). 
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Australia: In general the inheritance of the British model means that civil servants 
cannot easily be held accountable. In particular civil servants have at times, when 
questioned or asked to produce documents, successfully invoked the public interest 
immunity when appearing before committees13. One of the important ways in which 
ministerial accountability takes place is during Parliament’s plenary sessions 
especially through the institution of question time, draft resolutions, interpolations,  
special debates and budgetary approval. 
 
6.1.2 Enhancing the effectiveness of the oversight function of the National 
Department of Human Settlements   
  
What is required to enhance the effectiveness of the oversight function of the 
department of human settlements over the NHBRC is that: 
(a) Thematic oversight reports should, as far as feasible and practical, be part of the 
meeting agendas of the department’s strategic management forums.  
(b) All oversight reports should be reviewed in a comprehensive and coordinated 
manner. Over an above those produced by the “operational” oversight 
mechanisms related to the programme, finance, budget and the functioning of the 
respective organization, reports from external auditors, Board of Directors 
                                                          
13 Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice 8th ed (1997). 
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particularly when they cover different oversight elements (audit, investigation, 
inspection, evaluation and monitoring) should also be reviewed. 
(c) At all times the intention should be that the outcome of the above reviews should 
be fully linked to departmental actions in respect to the key strategic policy 
matters, to setting policy (strategy) and/or management directives on the 
pertinent issues.   
 
This will provide an opportunity for provinces to meaningfully engage with the 
NHBRC and other entities that do business with them. In such cases, provincial 
departments of human settlements may raise strategic matters that nay improve 
service delivery from both sides.  
 
6.2  Conclusion  
 
 
This study looked at the National Department of Human Settlement’s oversight role 
over its entities. The study took place in the context of a broad oversight 
management by the department of over its entities. However, the broader objective 
was to examine the internal systems and mechanisms used by the department in its 
oversight function with a specific focus on the National Home Builders Registration 
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Council as one of its entities and determined if there are any challenges impacting on 
its oversight role. Since the nature of the research was exploratory, it shared light in 
answering the primary research question.  
 
From the findings, it could be concluded that there is evidence ground breaking   that 
there are impediments in the oversight function of the Department of Human 
Settlements’ over the NHBRC. These impediments relate to the following: 
 
(a) Administrative bottleneck 
 
Ministerial responsibility is the cornerstone of accountability in the above 
governance set up. However the departmental hierarchy and lines of 
responsibility culminating in the Ministers is blurring the effectiveness of 
the department’s oversight.  
 
(b) Invisible shareholder/entity relationship management  
 
Legislatively the Minister of Human settlements is accountable for service 
delivery or policy implementation by all statutory agencies reporting to this 
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department.  However the current systems and procedures to ensure 
proper management and the efficient utilisation of resources allocated to 
the NHBRC are not convincingly adequate.  
 
In the context of this Department, it is clear that the ministerial 
responsibility over the NHBRC has been stretched to the limit. Generally, 
the problem is that whilst ministers can in the face of governance 
challenges disclaim responsibility in many instances, the traditional 
doctrine also excludes public servants from responsibility.  
Moreover, an investigative analysis of documentation from oversight organs of state 
such as the Auditor General and Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Human 
Settlements was also conducted. It was found that whilst the department exercises 
its oversight role over the NHBRC, its focus is mainly on compliance enforcement. 
There is no balance between legislative enforcement and service delivery on the part 
of NHBRC. A phenomenon that unveiled the need for an improvement oversight 
systems and approach. The researcher could not make inferences to other entities, 
however, the study helped in developing an understating of challenges and a 
framework for effective oversight. 
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Having researched on the oversight role of the National Department of Human 
Settlements on its entities: The case of National Home Builders Registration Council 
(NHBRC). 
 
 
6.3  Recommendations 
 
 
Recommendation 1: Strong Administrative Oversight  
It could be concluded, from the study that therefore that the Executive Authority 
should play an active role in discharging its responsibilities by insisting on a high 
standard of governance in order to strengthen the accountability of the Board, 
necessitating specific reports on a quarterly basis as per relevant statutes to enable 
the Executive Authority to monitor progress and performance.  
 
This is possible if there is common understanding between the parent department 
and the entity that promotes setting of targets, both financial and non-financial, and 
agrees on a (target) optimal capital structure annually before commencement of the 
budget process. As much as reasonably possible, government should clearly detail 
the role and responsibilities of the board as a whole and of individual directors, taking 
into account potential conflict of interest between the shareholder’s regulatory 
responsibilities as government and shareholder’s responsibilities on the other hand.  
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(i)  Capacity and organisation of the ‘parent’ department 
 
Good practice in this area is for parent departments to establish units with 
appropriate capacity to oversee the entities for which the Minister is responsible, and 
that all reporting lines should go through this unit, for both performance and finance. 
These units should also be responsible for giving feedback to entities (both from the 
Minister and based on their own analysis).  
 
In order to enhance its capacity, government should exercise its prime 
responsibilities and firstly be represented at the general shareholders meetings; 
secondly establish well structured and transparent board nomination processes in 
fully or majority owned SOEs, and actively participating in the nomination of all SOEs’ 
boards; and lastly set-up reporting systems allowing regular monitoring and 
assessment of SOE performance. 
 
(ii)   Shareholder representation at Board level 
 
It should make governance sense for the shareholder to be represented in the 
governing boards of its public entities so as to ensure that its interest are taken care 
off for coherent policy advocacy. There are many ways to enhance accountability of 
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entities through the governing bodies. Representation is one of them. It is 
acknowledged that government officials may get outvoted in board meetings and this 
ends up compromising the Department. In this instance, it is recommended that 
government officials should be appointed specifically to direct policy and advised on 
matters requiring the input of government.   
 
To ensure that independent voice can be heard on the board of the governing body, 
it is important to have majority of independent directors be appointed to the board. 
This is normally informed by the enabling legislation referred to earlier in the 
document. 
 
However, it should be emphaised that from the perspective of the shareholder, 
representation by one official on the board is the best way to enhance accountability 
of the governing body in some jurisdictions. It is particularly a common 
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(iii)   Set-up reporting systems allowing regular monitoring and assessment of public 
entities performance. 
 
Over and above the reporting systems and mechanism recommended by the 
regulatory frameworks, it is important to ensure that parent department should 
institute mechanisms that would avoid ddual accountability by accounting officers of 
entities to both the Accounting Authorities and Executive Authorities. As noted this is 
prevalent within the department‘s entities, and has created elements of mistrust 
between the CEOs and governing bodies of certain entities.   
 
This conflates good governance in that the CEO assumes the role of the governing 
body and promotes conflict of interest between the CEO’s management role and the 
required oversight accountability that is supposed to be exercised by the governing 
body.  
 
 (iv)  Institute a structured and transparent board nomination processes  
 
The study discovered that though Minister is empowered to appoint Council 
members, the administrative oversight do not ensure that there are processes in 
place to ensure relevant competency and expertise in the council.  
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The majority of the directors should be non-executive members to ensure an 
appropriate balance of power, as well as independence and objectivity in the 
governing body. An independent governing body member is one who has no 
relationship with the entity, its related entities, or its officers, that could interfere or 
reasonably be perceived to interfere with the exercise of the director’s independent 
business judgement regarding the best interests of the entity. The study discovered 
that this is a cause for concern in that the extent to which this is monitored by the 
department could not be measured.  
 
Therefore, to ensure that the management of the governing body is fit and proper, it 
is a widely adopted practice that they have to meet certain requirements in respect of 
honesty, integrity and competence. Supervisory authorities may assess the skills and 
knowledge of the governing body members through appropriate tests to make sure 
that it is competent enough to properly perform its duties. However disclosure should 
always be regarded as the most important tool to enhance accountability of the 
governing body to the parent department.   
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(v) Evading multiple strategic/policy directives:  
 
For public entities to deliver on mandates effectively, it is critical to institute proper 
oversight mechanism to ensure constant monitoring of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the operations of these entities in respect of policy implementation, and 
compliance with applicable legislation.  The extent to which this is monitored can only 
be measured by the manner in which policy directives to entities are streamlined and 
effectively managed. Multiple policy directives from different officials from the parent 
department do not only confuse the strategy of a particular entity but also opens 
space for misdirected innovativeness within the entity.  
 
(iv)  Improved Financial and Performance Accountability 
 
The performance of an entity, whether satisfactory or not is a mirror image of the 
department’s oversight efficiencies. Therefore relationship between parent 
department and entity is defined in terms of financial and performance accountability. 
In order for performance accountability to be measured, the objectives of entities 
have to be translated into annual performance targets.  
 
 110 
However, for proper oversight management, entities have to be established in terms 
of ‘own’ legislation. Where an entity is established in terms of legislation, the 
legislation stipulates governance provisions as well as its relationship with the 
Executive Authority including the signing of shareholder compact.  
 
A universal introduction of Shareholder Compacts or Performance Agreements will 
assist parent departments to: – 
- Formalise and regulate the working relationship between the Minister 
and the Board pursuant to the provisions of the Act applicable to the 
specific public entity and the PFMA. 
- Set out the mandated key performance measures and indicators to be 
attained by the public entity. 
- Facilitate the assessment and monitoring of the Board’s performance 
against the public entity performance in delivering the desired 
outcomes and objectives. 
- Define procedures and reporting channels for accountability 
arrangements and quarterly reporting to the Minister or the Minister’s 
representative in order to facilitate effective performance monitoring, 
evaluation, as set out in the Shareholder Compact or Performance 
Agreement and corrective action to be taken. 
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In support of the above initiatives, ‘the department’ may wish to adopt, as a matter of  
principle, the following modus operandi for enhancing the effectiveness of its 
oversight function:  
 
- Prioritise oversight reports and ensure they become part of the agenda 
for the strategic management and /or ministers meetings with the 
departmental executives 
- Review all the relevant parts of the oversight reports to elicit issues 
requiring attention – this may be done in a comprehensive and 
coordinated manner through analysis reports;  
- Link fully the above review to setting policy and/or management 
directives on the issues in question, with specific legislative actions on 
the strategic/policy matters whenever required;  
- In addition, make organizational arrangements to ensure that 
consideration of entities programme matters are linked systematically 
to the department’s consideration of administrative/budgetary/ financial 
matters;  
- Furthermore, consider/verify, either separately or as a part of the 
review exercise above, compliance with the legislative prescripts to 
enforce accountability and responsibility. 
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Recommendation 2: Improved regulatory frameworks 
 
It should be mentioned that the introduction of the legislative frameworks in South 
Africa do assist in the oversight management over entities and in guiding the 
relationship between the Executive Authorities and their entities. However there is 
room for improvement in that parent departments do not have absolute powers over 
their agencies on matters relating to the fiduciary powers of Board Members. The 
reform should improve overseer authority and afford adequate control powers to be 
able to exercise sufficient control.   
 
The approaches and means used to overseer the governance of entities have to be 
reviewed from time to time, in line with the trends and developments in this area 
accross the globe. For an example Governing Boards are charged with a 
responsibility to ensure that a State Owned Entity maintains an effective, efficient and 
transparent system of financial and risk management and internal control. In this 
regard Boards are required to establish processes and practices within the entities to 
manage all risks associated with the entities’ operations.  
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In broad terms, the Shareholder’s sensitivity over commercial risks should be taken 
care of by the Board.  This control measure should be supplemented by constant 
expression of intent in corporate plans and progress reports by the Board that it has 
appropriate risk management policies and practices in place and that adequate 
systems and expertise are being applied to achieve compliance with those policies 
and procedures. Whilst this is, to some extent adhered to, the requisite periodic 
checks and balances on the part of the shareholder has been lacking.   
 
Pursuant to the above, there is a continuing need to conduct continuous risk 
assessments to guard against any deviation from respective mandate thereby 
avoiding fruitless expenditure. Up until now the control adequacy and effectiveness is 
based exclusively on management perception.  The inherent danger in this is that 
management becomes more optimistic or pessimistic about the control environment 
than they really should be. 
 
The prevention of irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure should always be 
reason enough to undertake checks and balances. This could be done in a manner 
that does not compromise the independence of these entities particularly in respect 
of their audit processes. As delivered by this study, the manner in which this is 
effectively monitored by the Department of Human Settlements is a cause for 
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concern.  The prevalence of this challenge, if unchecked, has dire negative impact to 
service delivery.   
 
 
Recommendation 3: Strong Political Oversight  
 
The challenge facing portfolio committees is that they need to ensure that 
departments (including their public entities) provide good quality service delivery 
information in their strategic plans with tight performance targets and then to ensure 
that departments report against those targets in their annual reports. The oversight 
mechanisms have been relatively weak as the focus has been on narrow financial 
oversight only.  
 
Political meddling as a result of change in government or ministries has potential to 
undermine the structures and systems currently in place.  Although it is the 
prerogative of politicians to change policies, when this happens too frequently, or 
when the changes are perceived to be arbitrary or unnecessary, it generates 
resistance. Therefore political continuity regarding the roles and functioning of entities 
is crucial to ensuring their efficiency and effectiveness. 
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ANNEXURE A 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
INTERVIEW WITH DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALS  
 
 
 
Respondent Name:  
 
…………………………………………. 
 
Respondent Address: 
 
………………………………………….. 
………………………………………….. 
………………………………………….. 
 
Tel. No.: ……………………………….. 
 
 
 
Interviewer:  I declare that this interview was 
performed as instructed through a face-to-face interview 
with the interviewee and I ensured that all the questions 
were correctly asked. 
Interviewer Name:  …………………………. 
 
Date of interview:  …………………………. 
 
 
 
 
As part fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Management in Public Policy, students are 
required to conduct a research on topics of their choice in relation to public policy. 
 
 
My chosen Research Topic is: 
 
THE OVERSIGHT ROLE OF THE NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SETTLEMENTS ON ITS ENTITIES: THE CASE OF NHBRC   
 
You have been randomly chosen as one of the potential sources of information for this 
study. Your answers or information will solely be used for the purposes  of this study and 
will not be used to discredit you or your organisation in anyway.  Would you give me 
some of your time to go ahead with the interview/or complete the questionnaire? 
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A: PERSONAL DETAILS  
1.  Designation  
Deputy  Director General   
Chief Director  
Director  
Other 
 
2. Business Unit    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B: Questions  
1.  What is your view in respect of the strategic vision of the organisation towards its public entities? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------- 
2. In your role (as Department),  what systems and mechanisms have you put in place to conduct your 
oversight on your Department’s Entities? 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ 
3. Are these systems and mechanisms effective? 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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4. Has there been any impediments/challenges in your oversight role and what has been the nature of these 
impediments/challenges. ?    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
5. Do you think there could be better mechanisms to enhance your oversight? If Yes, elaborate 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
6. Do you believe that Good Corporate Governance is the basis for effective policy/mandate 
implementation for entities? If so, what oversight control measures have you put in place to promote good 
governance in your department.   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
7. Is there any additional information you may want to provide? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
End. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE  
INTERVIEW WITH NHBRC 
 
 
 
Respondent Name:  
 
…………………………………………. 
 
Public Entity: 
 
………………………………………… 
 
 
Designation: 
 
………………………………………… 
 
Physical Address: 
 
………………………………………….. 
………………………………………….. 
………………………………………….. 
 
Tel. No.: ……………………………….. 
 
Interviewer:  I declare that this interview was 
performed as instructed through a face-to-face 
interview with the interviewee and I ensured that all 
the questions were correctly asked. 
Interviewer Name:  ………………………… 
 
Date of interview:  …………………………. 
 
 
 
 
As part fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Management in Public Policy, students are 
required to conduct a research on topics of their choice in relation to public policy. 
 
 
My chosen Research Topic is: 
 
THE OVERSIGHT ROLE OF THE NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SETTLEMENTS ON ITS ENTITIES: THE CASE OF NHBRC   
 
Your organisation has been randomly chosen from the public entities of the National 
Department of Human Settlements as  the focal point of study for an academic research 
at the University of Witwatersrand. Information gathered through this research will 
solely be used for the purposes of this study and will not be used to discredit you or your 
organisation in anyway.  Would you give me some of your time to go ahead with the 
interview/or complete the questionnaire? 
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QUESTIONS 
 
1.  What is your view in respect of the strategic vision of the organisation towards the NHBRC? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ 
2. In your view (as the Accounting Officer), are current oversight systems and mechanisms used by NDOH 
effective? 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- 
3. To what extent does the NDoH assist your mission to effectively deliver your mandate?  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
4. From the strategic point of view, are there any impediments/challenges in your relationship with the 
Department? What is the nature of these impediments/challenges?    
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
5. Do you think there could be better mechanisms to enhance the relations? If Yes, elaborate 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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5. Do you believe that Good Corporate Governance is the basis for effective policy/mandate 
implementation for entities in general? If so, please explain, 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
7. Is there any additional information you may want to provide? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
End. 
 
 
 
